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The Applicability of the Self-fulfillment
Account of Welfare to Nonhuman Animals,
Babies, and Mentally Disabled Humans
Tatjana Visak and Jonathan Balcombe

T

he latest and arguably most promising
philosophical account of welfare is Daniel
Haybron’s self-fulfillment account (Haybron 2008).
Roughly, according to Haybron, welfare consists of
three aspects: (1) emotional flourishing, (2) success
in identity-related projects, and (3) the fulfillment of
the individual’s sub-personal nature. The latter refers
to aspects of her nature that are not related to her
personal idiosyncrasies or her “self.” Haybron
mentions health, vitality, and bodily pleasure in this
regard, since these things, according to Haybron,
benefit us simply because of the sort of creature we
are. So, strictly speaking, only emotional flourishing
and success in identity-related projects are aspects of
self-fulfillment.
However,
the
focus
on
self-fulfillment distinguishes Haybron’s account of
welfare from better-known varieties of eudaimonism,
which define welfare in terms of nature-fulfillment.
These other forms of eudaimonism do not focus on
the individual and its idiosyncrasies at all. They are
perfectionist
and
externalist,
rather
than
nonperfectionist and internalist.
The self-fulfillment account of welfare has never,
to our knowledge, been tested with regard to the
virtue of generality, which is one of the four
cardinal virtues for theories of welfare that L.W.
Sumner famously introduced (Sumner 1996, 14).
The virtue of generality holds that a theory of
welfare should be applicable to all beings with
welfare:
We make welfare assessments . . . concerning a wide variety
of subjects. Besides the paradigm case of adult human
persons, our welfare vocabulary applies just as readily to
children and infants, and to many non-human beings. It is

27

Volume 31, Number 2 (Summer 2013)

perfectly natural for me to say that my cat is doing well,
that having an ear infection is bad for her, that she has
benefited from a change of diet, and so on. In making these
judgments it certainly seems to me that I am applying
exactly the same concept of welfare to my cat that I
habitually apply to my friends. A theory of welfare will
therefore . . . be incomplete if it covers only them and
ignores her. (14)
In this paper we will argue that generality is a
virtue of Haybron’s account of welfare. Indeed,
reflecting on the applicability of his theory to
nonhuman animals will give us a better
understanding of its applicability to humans. We
will first focus on self-fulfillment and suggest an
interpretation of Haybron’s account according to
which the self-fulfillment of an individual consists
in the fulfillment of the aspects of the self that are
applicable to that particular individual. This makes
Haybron’s account of welfare applicable to all
sentient beings. Then we will focus on sub-personal
nature-fulfillment and argue that the same
interpretation leads to the conclusion that
Haybron’s account of welfare recognizes even
nonsentient beings as welfare subjects. We suggest a
way of avoiding this latter conclusion.
The Animal’s Self
According to Haybron, happiness, which he
conceives of as emotional flourishing, is part of
self-fulfillment, because it concerns the fulfillment
of the individual’s emotional nature, or – more
precisely – her emotional self. After all, as Haybron
puts it: “[H]appiness bears a special relation to the
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self: the facts about what makes us (authentically)
happy partially define who we are, our selves”
(Haybron 2008, 178). According to Haybron, an
individual’s emotional flourishing encompasses her
emotions, moods, and mood propensities, where the
latter are inclinations to be in a certain mood. So,
like hedonism, Haybron conceives of happiness in
terms of mental states, broadly conceived. However,
unlike hedonism, the mental states that Haybron
considers relevant for happiness are not simply
pleasant or unpleasant experiences, but rather
emotions, moods, and mood propensities. 1
There is broad consensus that mammals and
birds, at least, experience pleasure and pain (Rollin
1991; Panksepp 2004, 303–07; Balcombe 2006), and
growing agreement that these capacities extend to all
vertebrates (Stoskopf 1994; Braithwaite 2010) and
perhaps beyond (Sherwin 2001; Elwood 2011). More
broadly, they seem to experience enjoyment and
suffering. For example, rough-and-tumble play in
rats has been shown to raise their levels of the
“pleasure hormone” dopamine (Siviy et al. 1996),
and experienced rats will hurry to the hand of a
trusted human to be tickled, which induces high
levels of ultrasonic chirps associated in other
contexts with positive affect (Burgdorf and
Panksepp 2001; Panksepp and Burgdorf 2003).
Chickens inflicted with joint pain prefer water
adulterated with an analgesic, switching to pure
water when their pain subsides (Danbury et al.
2000). And the degree of cage-impoverishment in
captive mice and rats correlates to their
self-administration of an anxiolytic drug (Sherwin
and Olsson 2004), or amphetamines, respectively
(Bardo et al. 2001), presumably because these
substances provide relief from negative affective
states (for example, anxiety, frustration), as they do
for humans. It is a common practice, therefore, to
apply hedonistic accounts of welfare to nonhuman
animals.
However, do nonhuman animals also experience
the deeper emotions, moods, and mood propensities
that Haybron’s emotional-state account of happiness
refers to? Can these animals be truly happy or
unhappy in that sense? Studies with rats and with
starlings have documented pessimistic response
biases when the subjects are subjected to days of
unstimulating confinement, and more optimistic
biases by conspecifics kept in enriched environments
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(Harding et al. 2004; Bateson and Matheson 2007;
Matheson et al. 2008). Persecuted chimpanzees and
elephants are vulnerable to psychological breakdown
(Bradshaw et al. 2005; Brüne et al. 2006), and
baboon mothers whose infants have died show
patterns of hormone changes that parallel those of
bereaved women, and they seek therapy by
expanding their social (grooming) networks (Engh et
al. 2006). Few animal studies have sought to address
pleasure, let alone happiness, but there are
numerous accounts of animals showing joyous
affect in such circumstances as play, mischief,
liberation, and even humor (see Balcombe 2006).
Moreover, capacities for such negative moods as
bereavement, depression, and pessimism suggest that
positive moods are also present. It can always be
questioned where the line ought to be drawn
dividing highly sentient from less- or nonsentient
animals (Wise 2002). It is not a static line, and as
the above-cited examples illustrate, new information
has so far been expanding the inclusion zone.

There is broad consensus that mammals and
birds, at least, experience pleasure and pain, and
growing agreement that these capacities extend to
all vertebrates and perhaps beyond.

Haybron conceives of emotional nature, that is,
one’s disposition to be happy in certain
circumstances and not in others, as an aspect of the
self, next to other aspects, such as (1) the
individual’s social identity, which concerns her
social role and how others see her; (2) the
individual’s character, which concerns morally or
ethically relevant aspects of the individual; (3) the
individual’s temperament, for instance whether she
is generally cheerful, extroverted, depressed, and so
on; and (4) the individual’s self-understanding,
which refers to her understanding of her life, ideals,
projects, and relationships (Haybron 2008, 184).
These aspects of the self bear on what makes the
individual happy and on the individual’s
identity-related projects. So, let us explore to what
extent these aspects of the self are applicable to
nonhuman animals.
It seems that at least some animals, notably
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social animals, do have a social identity and projects
that are related to that identity. Animals’ roles are
nuanced and dynamic, varying across social,
temporal,
and
geographical
axes.
Most
temperate-zone songbirds, for instance, have a
nonbreeding season on their southerly wintering
grounds, a period of migration, a reproductive
season in the north, followed by a return migration
during
the
autumn.
Reproduction
alone
encompasses many projects, including courting,
mating,
nest-building,
incubation,
food
provisioning, and in many cases territory
maintenance. In some bird species, breeding pairs
are helped at the nest by nonbreeders, who may
include a prior year’s offspring, unrelated
conspecifics, or in at least one species, grandparents
(Skutch and Gardner 1999; Richardson et al. 2007).
These sorts of roles form an individual’s social
identity. Furthermore, these roles are fluid;
nest-helpers, for instance, may suddenly find
themselves in the role of parent should a primary
parent be lost (Blackmore and Heinsohn 2007).
One might object that the social roles of
animals, as opposed to humans, are not expressions
of individual idiosyncrasies, and thus are not really
aspects of the individual’s self-fulfillment. For both
humans and nonhumans it is hard to determine
which aspects of our social roles are expressions of
individual idiosyncrasies and which are expressions
of our sub-personal nature-fulfillment. For instance,
in some respects my being a mother may be an
expression of my sub-personal nature-fulfillment. In
other respects, my particular way of fulfilling that
role may be an aspect of my self-fulfillment. In the
fulfillment of social roles of humans and
nonhumans,
both
self-fulfillment
and
nature-fulfillment may be present to varying degrees.
Do animals possess a moral character? The idea
that animals might possess any degree of moral
character was dismissed until recently, and remains
controversial. However, social living fosters many
forms of virtuous behavior, for which there are
robust adaptive foundations, most notably
kin-selection and reciprocal altruism. When you live
among and co-depend upon others of your kind, it
behooves you to show consideration for others.
Cooperation, nurturance, consideration, and
empathy are widespread animal behaviors (De Waal
1996; Bekoff and Pierce 2010). That these behaviors
are accompanied by positive emotions is informed

by studies in which animals show a negative
response to unfair treatment. Studies in which two
monkeys alternately exchange tokens for a slice of
cucumber from a human experimenter, or in which
two dogs offer a paw for a handshake, proceed
smoothly through many trials if the exchange is
equitable. But if one monkey starts receiving a
preferred grape,
the other will no longer
accept cucumber
(Brosnan and de Waal 2003;
video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Hbb27GQ_X1I [accessed July 22, 2013]), and if
only one of the two dogs receives a treat for a
paw-shake, the other stops offering a paw much
sooner than if both, or none, are given treats (Range
et al. 2009).

The idea that animals might possess any degree of
moral character was dismissed until recently,
and remains controversial.

Do animals have temperaments? Research on
temperaments of individual animals, also called
“personalities” or “coping styles,” shows, for
instance, that individual sticklebacks differ
consistently across time and contexts as to how shy
or bold, explorative or avoiding, active, aggressive,
or sociable they are (Bell and Sih 2007). Similar
observations have been recorded about the boldness
of individual tits (Carere and Van Oers, 2004), the
fearfulness, understanding, extroversion, and
dominance of individual gorillas (Weiss et al. 2012),
and other temperaments of many other animals.
Do animals have self-understanding? Once again,
it was believed not so until Gordon Gallop showed
that chimpanzees would inspect themselves and
notice a mark placed surreptitiously on their
forehead when presented with a mirror (Gallop
1970). Subsequently, other great apes, dolphins,
elephants, and magpies have passed the mirror
self-recognition test, and at least one study provides
evidence for it in monkeys (Rajala et al. 2010). It
should be added that failure to pass a mirror
self-recognition test may not indicate a lack of a
sense of self in a nonhuman animal. Related
capacities include theory of mind – the ability to
attribute mental states to oneself and others – and
metacognition, an awareness of one’s own
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knowledge. Evidence for both of these abilities has
been garnered for nonhumans (for example, Foote
and Crystal 2007; Horowitz 2009).
It holds for humans and for nonhuman animals
that different aspects of the self are applicable to
any particular individual to a particular degree, or
not at all, depending on her species and on her level
and stage of development. For instance, it seems odd
to talk about the moral character of a newborn
human baby. The self-understanding of a particular
mentally disabled human can be very limited.
Denying that the baby or the mentally disabled
human are subjects of welfare, however, would not
only reflect very badly on the theory’s generality. It
would also severely diminish the theory’s fidelity,
which is a different but related cardinal virtue of
accounts of welfare that Sumner distinguishes. It
says that the account should correspond to the
concept of welfare, as commonly understood, rather
than talking about something completely different.
The self-fulfillment theory of welfare may
account for these cases in the following way: We
suggest that if aspects of the self are not applicable
to any particular individual, they are not part of her
welfare. Thus, these aspects may be left out of
consideration. The fulfillment of all aspects of the
self that are applicable to any particular individual,
in turn, accounts for that individual’s welfare. In
that way, it seems that Haybron’s self-fulfillment
account of welfare can live up to the virtue of
generality: It can “cover all core cases” and “provide
a principled resolution of the peripheral cases”
(Sumner 1996, 18). The cases where we doubt
whether any aspect of the self applies are typically
the cases where we doubt whether the being can be
affected in her welfare and thus whether the concept
of welfare applies. Nevertheless, we should always be
cautious before striking an animal off the welfare
list. Clams, for instance, are in the same phylum as
cephalopod mollusks (octopi and squids), at least
one member of which has been deemed worthy of
protection under animal welfare law (Animals
Scientific Procedures Act 1986).
A noteworthy implication of this interpretation
of Haybron’s account of welfare is that losing the
potential for a certain aspect of self-fulfillment does
not in itself count as harmful for the individual.
After all, the individual’s welfare would simply be
assessed on the basis of the aspects that were still
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available. If the individual could not be considered
the same individual anymore, in a relevant sense,
the loss would be considered harmful, though,
because it would deprive the individual of all her
future welfare.
Animal Nature
The third aspect of welfare, which Haybron more
tentatively suggests including, is the fulfillment of
the individual’s sub-personal nature. According to
Haybron, how well off an individual is may depend
not only on the extent to which the individual
fulfills her emotional self and succeeds in her
identity-related projects. It may also depend on how
the individual fares with regard to some other
aspects that do not concern her personality. What
Haybron has in mind here are criteria such as
health, vitality, and physical pleasure. What is
healthful for an individual, according to Haybron,
does not depend on her personality. It is simply
determined by the sort of creature the individual is.
His idea is, for instance, that exercise is healthful for
humans, simply because of the sort of beings we
humans have evolved to be. Haybron refers to these
aspects of our natures as our “nutritive” or “animal
natures,” indicating that certain things are good for
us simply because of the sort of animal we are.
This aspect of Haybron’s account of welfare can
straightforwardly be applied to nonhuman animals.
Theories of animal welfare typically include the
criterion that animals are better off to the extent
that they can live according to their species-specific
nature (Webster 1994; Ohl and Van der Staay 2011).
For instance, since the pig evolved as a terrestrial
forager, living on an earthen substrate contributes to
her flourishing, and it is part of the volant bird’s
nature-fulfillment to fly. Indeed, with regard to
nonhuman animals, concern with their welfare has
focused nearly exclusively on sub-personal
nature-fulfillment. There has been very little
attention to individual idiosyncrasies and
self-fulfillment, properly speaking. Only recently,
and mainly with regard to pets, individual
idiosyncrasies are being mentioned in relation to
animal welfare (Yeates 2013).
What are the implications for the generality of
Haybron’s account of welfare? Physical pleasure,
health, and vitality are applicable to all animals,
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including humans at various stages and levels of
development. Physical pleasure does not apply to
nonsentient beings. However, health and vitality are
applicable to nonsentient individuals as well. It is
conceivable to speak about the health and vitality of
a nonsentient embryo and fetus, the health and
vitality of a bug or spider, and the (assumingly
poor) health and vitality of a permanently comatose
patient. Furthermore, one may even speak about
the health and vitality of plants. Thus, our above
proposal concerning the applicability of Haybron’s
account to a wide range of welfare subjects – which
is to ignore the aspects of welfare that are not
applicable to any particular individual – leads to the
conclusion that Haybron’s account of welfare is
applicable to trees, bugs, embryos, or comatose
patients. To the extent that at least some of the
aspects of welfare apply to any particular individual,
this individual is, according to that interpretation, a
subject of welfare.

Vitality and health may count toward an
individual’s welfare only to the extent that they
affect the individual’s emotional flourishing or her
success in fulfilling her identity-related projects.

We are not sure whether Haybron would happily
embrace this implication, which certainly deviates
from many prominent accounts of welfare, in
particular subjectivist accounts such as hedonism
and preferentialism. Many consider welfare as
inherently subjective. For instance, Sumner explains
that welfare literally takes the point of view of the
subject, so that unless there is something that it is
like to be creature x, creature x cannot have welfare
(Sumner 1996). On the other hand, Aristotelian
eudaimonistic accounts of welfare or objective-list
accounts of welfare, with items such as health and
vitality on the list, do not exclude nonsentient
welfare subjects. Acceptance of nonsentient welfare
subjects may also be in line with common-sense
psychology. After all, many people normally speak
about the (poor) welfare of a comatose patient,
about a bug being made worse off by losing a leg, or
even about the flourishing of a plant.

Welfare, Self, and Animal Nature
Here is a possible revision of Haybron’s account of
welfare that avoids the conclusion that nonsentient
individuals are subjects of welfare. One may not
include the fulfillment of the individual’s
sub-personal nature as a separate aspect of welfare.
Instead, sub-personal nature fulfillment can be
included, where relevant, as a part of emotional
flourishing and the fulfillment of identity-related
projects. To the extent that sub-personal
nature-fulfillment does not bear on these two things,
it can be left out of the definition of welfare.
Vitality and health, for instance, may count toward
an individual’s welfare only to the extent that they
affect the individual’s emotional flourishing or her
success in fulfilling her identity-related projects. In
that sense, only beings that can flourish emotionally
or have identity-related projects, and thus only
sentient beings, are subjects of welfare. This would
deviate from Haybron’s current position since he
holds that sub-personal nature-fulfillment directly
contributes to an individual’s welfare. For instance,
he considers being healthy good for a person, in
and of itself, whether the person desires and enjoys
it or not.
It may seem odd to consider health to be only
instrumentally valuable for welfare. However, this
view of the value of health is in line with hedonist
and preferentialist accounts of welfare. If one’s ill
health does not in any way – neither directly nor
indirectly, neither in the short nor the long run –
negatively affect one’s experienced quality of life,
then arguably one’s welfare is not negatively
affected. This scenario is empirically extremely
unlikely, though, and this may explain why the idea
that health is not an aspect of welfare seems odd.
Although Haybron currently holds that
sub-personal nature-fulfillment counts directly
toward welfare, doing away with this assumption
may improve his theory in various ways. For
instance, contrary to what Haybron suggests, the
distinction between self-fulfillment and sub-personal
nature-fulfillment cuts across the two other aspects
of welfare, namely emotional flourishing and success
in identity-related projects. So, positing sub-personal
nature-fulfillment as a third aspect of welfare,
besides these two, seems not to get things right.
Instead, the fulfillment of an individual’s
sub-personal nature is an important aspect of her
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emotional flourishing and of her identity-related
projects.
Support for this reading can be found in the
following citation where Haybron refers to bears in
an analogy for pointing out the limitations of
current happiness research:
A further limitation of most research... is the homogeneity
of the populations studied. To an Amish farmer or San
hunter, or the fisherman on the island mentioned..., the
affluent Westerners who mostly get studied may seem to be
leading pretty near identical ways of life. If all your subjects
live in similar environments, then of course the role of
environment in determining happiness is going to seem
limited. It is as if one were to run a series of studies on zoo
bears and circus bears, find not much difference in
well-being between the groups, and conclude that it doesn’t
matter very much what environment you put bears in.
Here, Haybron seems to suggest that certain
environments make bears happier and certain
environments make humans happier. If this is true,
happiness or emotional flourishing partly consists
in nature-fulfillment rather than only in
self-fulfillment. Thus, emotional flourishing and
nature-fulfillment are not separate aspects of welfare,
but the former contributes to the latter.

Welfare, according to Haybron, consists in
self-fulfillment, in particular in emotional
flourishing and success with regard to
identity-related projects.

Another piece of support can be found in
Haybron’s discussion of the benefits of exposure to
natural environments, notably trees, for human
welfare. Haybron cites evidence that exposure to
nature contributes positively to our emotions,
moods, and mood propensities (Haybron 2011). If
so, it holds because of the sort of creature we have
evolved to be, rather than because of individual
idiosyncrasies. Thus, emotional flourishing partly
consists in the fulfillment of our sub-personal
natures.
Last, Haybron’s motivation for studying
happiness was evoked by his belief that the people
on an island where he spent much of his childhood
were leading happier lives than the mainlanders
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among whom he usually lived. This, as well, suggests
that certain environments and lifestyles seem to
enhance our happiness and welfare, simply because
of the sort of creature we have evolved to be: the
fulfillment of our sub-personal natures contributes
significantly to our emotional flourishing rather
than being a separate aspect of welfare.
Likewise, what we take physical pleasure in
expresses both our sub-personal natures and our
individual idiosyncrasies. Haybron lists physical
pleasure under sub-personal nature-fulfillment.
However, what we take physical pleasure in does not
depend only on our sub-personal natures. Even for
broccoli – Haybron’s example of what humans take
pleasure in simply because of the sort of creatures
we are – it does not hold that all humans like it.
The same is true for other physical “pleasures,” such
as cold showers, sunbaths, saunas, massages, and
various sexual practices. Instead of listing physical
pleasures under sub-personal nature-fulfillment, one
might conceive of them as an aspect of emotional
flourishing.
Conclusion
We have not endorsed here any particular position
on the question of what entities should be ascribed
welfare. Instead, we have explored the generality of
Haybron’s account of welfare. After all, in order to
point out the implications of the self-fulfillment
account of welfare for (welfarist) moral theory and
welfare-directed policy-making, one needs to
understand what this account entails, and whom it
applies to.
Welfare, according to Haybron, consists in
self-fulfillment, in particular in emotional
flourishing and success with regard to
identity-related projects. Haybron distinguishes
several aspects of the self that bear on emotional
flourishing and identity-related projects. These
aspects of the self are applicable to nonhuman
animals and to human beings to different degrees or
not at all. We suggest an interpretation of
Haybron’s account of welfare according to which
the self-fulfillment of an individual consists in
fulfilling the aspects of the self that apply to that
particular individual.
This interpretation of the self-fulfillment account
of welfare has the virtue of generality. It also has the
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virtue of fidelity, because any account of welfare
that yielded the conclusion that babies, mentally
disabled humans, and animals lack welfare would
not seem to be in line with our common
understanding of welfare.
Besides self-fulfillment, Haybron tentatively
proposes taking on board the fulfillment of the
individual’s sub-personal nature as a third aspect of
welfare. Including this as a separate aspect of welfare
implies that nonsentient animals, comatose patients,
and arguably even plants are subjects of welfare. If
we do not include the fulfillment of the individual’s
sub-personal nature as a separate aspect of welfare,
we avoid the inclusion of nonsentient beings as
welfare subjects. This would imply, contra Haybron’s
current position, that sub-personal nature-fulfillment
is only instrumentally valuable for welfare.
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Notes:
Although it is clear that emotions and moods are
mental states, it is debatable whether Haybron is
right in conceiving of mood propensities as mental
states too. Arguably, if these concern the likelihood
of being in a certain mood, they may not be
themselves emotional states, since they are not
themselves something that the individual
consciously experiences. On the other hand, if
mood propensities are not mental states, in the
sense of states of the mind, then what are they?
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